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Abstract 
 
    By examining data on the gold forward offered rate (GOFO) and lease rates over the 
period 1996- 2009, we conclude that the convenience yield of gold is better approximated by 
the lease rate than the interest-adjusted spread of Fama & French (1983). Using the latter 
quantity, we study the relationship between gold leasing and the level of COMEX 
discretionary inventory and exhibit that lease rates are negatively related to inventories. We 
also show that Futures prices have increasingly exceeded forward prices over the period, and 
this effect increases with the speculative pressure and the maturity of the contracts. 
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We study in this paper the effects of the gold lease rate, speculative and pricing pressure in 
the gold market. The gold market of today is a much different market than it was 10 years 
ago.  The New York Commodity Exchange (COMEX) is witnessing historically low lease 
rates, decreasing hedging activity and steadily rising non-commercial open interest.  For a 
market that was once dominated by commercial1 positions, this is a fundamental change in 
the status quo. This ever-increasing percentage of non-commercial open interest results from 
the intense activity of two new classes of gold investors: gold exchange traded funds (ETF) 
and non-commercial speculators.  With their recent proliferation and rising influence, ETFs 
are playing an ever more prominent and escalating role in the complex dynamics that now 
affect the price of gold.  Speculators are also betting on the gold price in increasing numbers 
as commodities are now common in investment portfolios and major currencies become 
demonetised. The gold market, once the domain of an eclectic group colloquially known as 
"gold bugs", is now readily accessible to any investor wishing to put savings into gold 
bullion. However, historically, central banks and bullion banks were the primary gold trading 
agents. Presently, with gold investment demand increasing and trades facilitated by electronic 
trading platforms, non-traditional investors are seeking to direct their capital to gold. More 
generally, gold is increasingly becoming a financial investment rather than a commodity in 
the traditional sense. 
 
Before the recent increase in investors’ interest and the creation of ETFs, central banks and 
bullion banks were among the largest operators in the gold futures market. Indeed, prior to 
the Washington Agreement on Gold sales in 1999, central banks bought and sold significant 
quantities of gold, thereby either directly or indirectly affecting the price of bullion. This idea 
that central bank sales could impact the price of gold was examined by Salant and Henderson 
(1978).  They found that a government gold auction served to depress the price of gold; yet, 
under some circumstances, it could also pressure the price of gold to rise2 at a rate that 
exceeded the real rate of interest.  These results lead Salant and Henderson to suggest that 
that the Hotelling (1931) model of exhaustible resources is unable to properly describe gold 
price movements.  More specifically, it is not capable of predicting the observed increases in 
the gold price that occur at rates exceeding the prevailing rate of interest. Their results were 
related to a period prior to 1978, contrasting with the remarkably steady increase of gold 
prices over the past decade, as depicted in figure (1) below. Moreover, the recent purchase by 
the Central Bank of India of 200 million ounces of gold from the IMF, followed by Mauritius 
and Sri Lanka, show that central banks are more concerned than ever by their gold reserves. 
 
                                                 
1 Held by hedgers 
2 In percentage terms. 
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FIGURE 1: EVOLUTION OF THE GOLD PRICE OVER THE PERIOD SPANNING FROM 1996 UNTIL 2009. 
 
I. On Speculative Pressure and its Possible Effects 
 
The gold futures market has undergone significant changes in the last two decades.  In recent 
times, the market has been dominated by non-commercial long players and has also 
witnessed positive values of the speculative pressure for an extended period of time.  This is a 
significant break from the historical precedent of high levels of hedging activity. 
 
Keynes' theory of normal backwardation implies that the net supply of commercial futures 
contracts, or hedging pressure, affects the equilibrium futures prices.  This can lead to rises or 
falls in futures prices over time.  Such an equilibrium trend can be interpreted as the risk-
premium.  When hedgers take long positions, the equilibrium achieved is such that futures 
prices tend to decrease over time.  Conversely, in a market where short hedging dominates, 
futures prices tend to increase over time. However, not all market agents can freely diversify 
their portfolios and, as a result, a price bias is created.  In a Keynesian world, producers will 
hedge their short positions by taking a corresponding long futures position in the physical 
commodity. The resulting net supply of futures contracts, termed the hedging pressure, 
creates a downward pressure on futures prices of distant maturities. This decrease, called 
backwardation is often termed “normal backwardation” as it was the shape usually observed 
in commodities during the previous decades. 
 
Speculators are economic agents that usually acquire long positions in futures markets. In 
order to enter into a long futures position, they require a premium as compensation for the 
risk that they bear, the aforementioned risk-premium. However, speculators are not the only 
agents that take these long positions. Producers and refiners facing inventory problems may 
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also take long futures positions. Combined, both producers' and speculators' long positions 
can result in an upward bias, or contango, in futures prices.  This situation can be particularly 
acute when inventories are more variable than prices. 
 
In support of the hedging pressure hypothesis, Bessembinder (1992) found that returns in the 
agricultural commodity markets vary with the net holdings of hedgers.  Using cross-sectional 
commodity data along with trader position data, Bessembinder showed that hedging pressure 
has an explanatory power for risk premia. More specifically, he found that unconditional 
futures returns have mean returns that do not differ significantly from zero. In contrast, when 
those returns were conditioned on hedging pressure, he reported that mean futures returns 
were significantly different than zero.   
 
In more recent work on hedging effects, de Roon, Nijman and Veld (2000) modelled the 
returns on a portfolio consisting of non-marketable risks, investment assets and futures 
contracts.  Such a model allowed for the existence of a relationship between the risk-premium 
and the hedging pressure, which was calculated using bi-monthly observations of traders’ 
positions taken from the CFTC.  Their model was such that hedging pressure arises from 
risks that agents either do not, or cannot, hedge as a result of market frictions or transaction 
costs.  Under such assumptions, de Roon et al. showed that hedging pressure leads to price 
bias.  They also found that returns were influenced by hedging pressure, not just the hedging 
pressure in the commodity's own market but across commodity markets.  By controlling for 
price pressure, measured as a change in hedging pressure, de Roon et al. showed that hedging 
pressure is responsible for the formation of price bias in futures prices.  Additionally, they 
found that hedging pressure influences not just futures returns, but returns on the underlying 
asset of the futures contract. 
 
To understand how speculative agents can affect the gold futures market, we examined the 
open interest data from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Commitment 
of Traders (CoT) report.  The CoT report contains open interest data regarding the various 
trading positions of the futures market for gold3.  The open interest data is separated into 
various categories that represent the possible trading positions.  These are subsequently 
decomposed into various reporting categories themselves.  The primary distinction is between 
reportable and non-reportable positions.  Reportable positions can be further partitioned into 
commercial and non-commercial positions.  According to CFTC regulations, commercial 
positions consist of those market positions used primarily for hedging4.  We thus identify 
commercial open interest with hedging activity. Conversely, non-commercial positions are 
                                                 
3 In the CFTC CoT report, there are multiple categories of data.  We are interested in commercial and non-
commercial (all) data.  The category denoted by "other" is not utilized in this paper but contains information 
regarding the remaining futures contracts. In short, this category contains traders not categorized as either "long" 
or "short" under the CFTC reporting framework. Specifically, we use non-commercial long, short and spread 
(all), commercial long and short (all) and non-reporting long and short (all).  We also use the data for total open 
interest (all). 
4 We refer to the definition of a "hedging transaction" as specified in the CFTC Electronic Code of Federal 
Regulations (e-CFR) section 1221(b)(2)(A).  This definition details a "hedging transaction" to be "any 
transaction that a taxpayer enters into in the normal course of the taxpayer's trade or business primarily for 
various risk management activities. 
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identified with speculative activity. This category includes positions taken by speculative 
institutions like hedge funds, for example. The classification is not rigorous, however, as 
some commercial positions may be speculative in nature while some non-commercial 
positions may be associated with hedging activity5. This classification can be further 
subdivided into long, short and, in the case of the non-commercial data, spread positions.  
These data comprise a subset of the total open interest.  Since aggregate activity by hedge 
funds and other institutions are likely to increase the speculative activity, this may result in a 
net positive number of long futures contracts in comparison to short futures contracts. 
Subsequently, it is possible to calculate a measure of the excess of long contracts over short 
contracts. 
 
To quantify the speculative activity in the gold futures market we define the speculative 
pressure as the analogue to the hedging pressure of de Roon et al (2000).  The speculative 
pressure, tψ , is given by equation (1): 
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2++
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where NC indicates non-commercial open interest.  Speculative pressure can be a measure for 
characterizing a commodity market as either net long speculation or net short hedging if the 
open interest of reporting speculative long open interest6 exceeds (or is less than) speculative 
short open interest. This interpretation is backed by the work of Hirshleifer (1990) who 
identifies hedging pressure with the supply of futures contracts.  Hirshleifer states that high 
values of hedging pressure result in a decrease in futures prices in comparison to the expected 
future spot price.  This effect manifests itself through the existence of a downward bias that is 
present in futures prices.  
 
 
Our inventory data consists of daily observations of gold bullion inventories held by the 
COMEX market making members and is recorded in troy ounces. These aggregated 
inventory data are subdivided into two categories: registered stocks and eligible stocks.  The 
"registered" designation implies that the bullion is eligible for delivery against a futures 
contract.  Conversely, the "eligible" designation refers to bullion inventories kept in the 
warehouse but not yet certified for delivery.  In general, these inventory levels are not 
necessarily indicative of underlying supply and demand conditions.  This is because the 
major depository institutions7 choose independently when to deposit their stocks. 
Additionally, other bullion warehouses exist for which COMEX does not possess inventory 
statistics. These observations span the period from the beginning of January 1996 until the 
end of October 2009 and were used to construct a weekly series of de-trended and 
                                                 
5 For example, we know that banks sometimes hedge because they have an OTC contract with a customer who 
may be hedging or speculating.  Consequently, this may blur the distinction between hedgers and speculators 
and results in noisy speculator (i.e., non-commercial) data. But by in large, the classification holds. 
6 i.e., non-commercial long open interest 
7 These include Brink's Inc., Scotia Mocatta, HSBC Bank, USA and Manfra, Tordella & Brookes, Inc. 
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studentized inventory levels similar to the procedure described in Dincerler et al. (2005).  
Initially, we created an inventory innovation series using an ARIMA(0,1,0) model and then 
divided the residuals by their standard deviation the resulting series of innovations.  This 
procedure resulted in a series of discretionary inventories, as described by Routledge, Seppi 
and Spatt (2000).  The value of using discretionary inventory levels lies with the observation 
that this measure of inventory is indicative of the balance between the current and future 
consumption value of the commodity.  The level of discretionary inventory is therefore 
closely associated with the concept of a convenience yield. 
  
Our open interest data consists of weekly open interest values for commercial, non-
commercial and small trader positions collected from the CFTC Commitment of Traders 
reports.  The data span the period from January 1996 until October 2009 and consist of a total 
of 712 weekly observations.   
 
From daily observations of the gold futures price, we compiled a weekly series of futures 
prices for the first, third, sixth and twelfth nearby gold futures contracts traded on COMEX 
that resulted in a series for which prices are observed every Tuesday. In order to construct a 
continuous returns series, we used the method outlined in de Roon et al (2000). This series of 
Tuesday prices corresponds to the dates on which the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) releases their weekly Commitment of Traders (CoT) report containing 
the levels of market open interest.   
 
 
II. The Effect of Speculative Pressure on Returns 
 
In recent years, commodities have become a very popular investment and are now present in 
the portfolios of investors as an asset class that provides not only diversification but 
profitable returns.  To that effect, it is apropos to study the factors affecting commodity 
futures returns.  We do so using a regression model similar to that of de Roon et al. (2000): 
 
 tt
PS
ttiti rrr εψβββα ++++= − 3500&21,1,  (2) 
 
Equation (2) regresses the return of the thi  returns series for the 1, 3, 6 and 12 month futures 
contracts on past returns, 1, −tir , the return on the S&P 500 market portfolio, 
500&PS
tr , and the 
speculative pressure, tψ .  Least-squares coefficient estimates and their associated standard 
errors are reported in table (I). 
 
[Table I about here] 
 
For all returns series, the constant coefficient is small, positive and not statistically 
significant.  A similar result holds for the coefficient of lagged returns, confirming the 
classical result that past returns are not reliable predictors of current futures returns.  The 
returns on gold futures contracts are positively related to the returns on the market portfolio, 
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but the result is not statistically significant.  We note in particular that speculative pressure 
exerts a positive influence on returns.  For all months, the speculative pressure coefficient is 
positive and highly significant, having a consistent value of approximately 0.008. As a 
robustness check, we include the price pressure discussed in de Roon et al (2000) that results 
from increased demand for contracts and takes the form of a change in speculative pressure. 
Specifically, an increase in demand for futures contracts will result in a temporary upward 
futures price bias.  This is the price pressure hypothesis. In order to compare the regression 
coefficients on speculative pressure and price pressure, we divide each term by its respective 
standard deviation. This leads to the regression model described in equation (2): 
 
 ( ) ( ) tt
t
t
tSNP
ttiti rrr εψσ
ψβψσ
ψβββα +Δ
Δ++++= − 4350021,1,  (2) 
 
The associated coefficient estimates are shown in Table (II). 
 
[Table II about here] 
 
We confirm that neither the constant term nor past returns influence current returns, which is 
consistent with our previous findings. Moreover, there seems to be a more pronounced 
speculative effect for the longer maturity futures returns series, which is consistent with the 
fact that a number of speculators make bets on the long-term price of gold (also expressed by 
the purchase of shares of gold mining companies). Despite this, price pressure effects 
dominate speculative pressure effects, the former being highly significant while the latter 
exhibits exceedingly small p-values.  Thus, for long-term returns series, there is a conclusive 
effect that speculative pressure, in part, determines futures returns even after controlling for 
past returns.  Additionally, we note that the price pressure coefficient, 4β , is positive and 
highly significant across all returns series, suggesting that demand for futures contracts, in 
part, determines futures risk premia. 
 
 
III. Central Banks and the Gold Leasing Market 
 
For most of its existence, the gold futures market was used for the gold carry trade8. The 
carry trade was facilitated by central banks wishing to earn a return on their bullion 
inventories. This trade involved borrowing gold from the inventories of central banks and 
consisted of either leasing or swapping gold in exchange for a fee.  In this manner, the gold 
could be leased at a relatively low rate from the central bank and then sold quickly on the 
spot market.  The proceeds from such a sale could then be invested at the London Interbank 
Offer Rate (LIBOR) or in Treasury bills.  Because the lease rates charged by the central 
banks were less than the LIBOR rate, this was on average a profitable trading strategy as long 
as the spot price did not move significantly.  The leasing institution was essentially able to 
earn the Gold Forward Offered (GOFO) rate as a return. However, since late 2001, the 
                                                 
8 See "Bullish on Bullion'' by Peter Madigan, Risk, February 1, 2008. 
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profitability of the short-maturity carry trade has diminished.  Rising gold prices have 
increased the risk and diminished the trade's profitability due to an accompanying increase in 
repayment costs9. 
 
To gain insight into this aspect of the gold market, we will consider how a central bank can 
proactively use gold to create a yield from its bullion inventories.  A central bank can lease 
gold to the market using two methods.  The first is by simply leasing bullion to another 
institution.  The second method is essentially a swap whereby gold is exchanged for U.S. 
dollars.  The leasing of gold by central banks is relatively straightforward as a transaction.  
The rate at which gold is leased is derived from the difference between the LIBOR and 
GOFO rates and is given by equation (3): 
 
 GOFOLIBORlease −=  (3) 
 
This is considered a derived rate since it is not set independently, but rather arises from the 
difference between the market quoted LIBOR and GOFO rates. A leasing transaction would 
involve a central bank transferring ownership of the gold to the leasing institution at a rate 
defined by equation (3), for the duration of the loan.  At a later date, the leasing institution, or 
borrower, would buy back or simply return the gold and pay the central bank the original loan 
plus the lease rate as interest. Hence, the leasing bank is able to generate a profit using this 
transaction while the central bank earns the difference between the LIBOR and GOFO on its 
idle gold inventories. 
 
The second type of transaction is actually less a swap than a sale and repurchase agreement. 
In a gold swap, a central bank is willing to exchange its gold bullion for cash. With the 
leasing transaction, the ownership title of the gold is transferred to the leasing institution 
through an actual sale, with the added condition that the central bank agrees to repurchase the 
gold from the borrower at some forward date.  In selling gold to the borrower, the central 
bank receives U.S. dollars and, in addition to agreeing to a repurchase, the central bank also 
pays interest to the leasing institution at the GOFO rate.  The GOFO is thus the interest rate 
charged on a loan denominated in dollars and using gold as collateral.  Once in his/her 
possession, the borrower is free to sell the gold on the spot market and invest the proceeds as 
before, or to simply hold the bullion and earn the secured GOFO rate. 
 
In a gold swap, the central bank pays GOFO to the borrower.  Since the GOFO rate is less 
than the LIBOR rate, the advantage for the central bank is that it exchanges gold for cash 
reserves that can be invested at a rate that exceeds the GOFO. The difference between the 
investment at LIBOR and the payment of GOFO is the lease r ate. 
 
Unlike the derived lease rate, the GOFO rate is the mean of a series of rates offered by the 
market making members of the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA). Hence, these 
market makers can, to some extent, adjust the GOFO up or down depending on market 
conditions.  Thus, we can think of the GOFO rate as an observable signal from the 
                                                 
9 The gold carry trade (like all carry trades) is profitable when gold prices are either stable or decreasing. 
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participating banks.  When the GOFO rates are set such that there is a high differential with 
the LIBOR, the market makers are interested in exchanging bullion for U.S. dollars, a signal 
that banks are interested in obtaining cash using gold as collateral.  This usually occurs under 
conditions of high demand for bullion.  When the GOFO rate is set close to the LIBOR, 
neither strategy explained previously is highly profitable and consequently, the banks signal a 
willingness to contribute liquidity.  This situation occurs under low demand for gold, but also 
when the gold price is high and/or rising.  In light of this, we can think of the lease rate as a 
proxy for aggregate demand for physical gold or, more accurately, as the convenience yield 
of gold (see Kaldor (1939)). 
  
 
IV. Convenience Yield and Lease Rate 
 
We explained that in a gold leasing transaction, the central bank earns the difference between 
the prevailing LIBOR and current GOFO rate. As a result, the lease rate is effectively an 
observable quantity related to the convenience yield, the latter being itself obtained from the 
interest-adjusted basis. Following the “basis” introduced by Telser (1958), Fama and French 
(1988) define the interest-adjusted basis by  
 
   IABt = f (t,T) − S(t)S(t) − R(t,T)  (4) 
 
This is the difference between the basis ( ) ( )( ) ( )tStSTtf /, −  and the interest rate.  Moreover, 
the spot-forward relationship can be written as 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )TtcTtwTtRtS
tSTtf ,,,, −+=−  (5) 
 
where f t,T( ) is the forward price, )(tS  is the spot price at time t , ),( TtR  is the interest rate 
over the period from t  to T , and ),( Ttw  and ),( Ttc  are the relative warehousing cost and 
relative convenience yield, respectively.  Together, equations (4) and (5) provide us with the 
following relationship 
 
                                                IABt = w t,T( )− c t,T( )                                              (6)  
 
 
V. Price Differences between Forward and Futures Contracts 
 
In a seminal paper, Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1981) have exhibited that even in absence of 
credit risk, forward and futures prices are not equal under stochastic interest rates. French 
(1983) and Park and Chen (1985) empirically confirmed this result and exhibited that, on 
average, futures prices exceeded forward prices.  If we consider a gold forward contract of 
maturityT , we have at date 0 the following equality 
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 f0 = S0e r+w−c( )T                             (7) 
 
where r is the cost of financing over the period ( )T,0 . To express equation (7) in terms 
relevant to the gold market, we recall that a central bank can either lease the gold directly, or 
engage in a gold swap with a suitable counterparty.  In the former case, the central bank earns 
the lease rate as a pure result of holding physical gold.  Since this quantity is earned by 
holding a physical inventory, the lease rate can be interpreted as the convenience yield of 
gold.  The counterparty to the leasing agreement is charged the lease rate on the bullion loan, 
but can immediately sell the gold on the spot market and invest the proceeds in a secure 
investment at, for example the LIBOR rate.  Thus, the borrower is able to earn the difference 
between the LIBOR and lease rates, which is equivalent to GOFO. 
 
The second strategy, a swap, allows the central bank to exchange gold for dollars.  The swap 
is therefore a loan of dollars, secured with gold as collateral.  Under the swap agreement, the 
central bank can invest the dollars at LIBOR while agreeing to pay the GOFO rate to the 
holder of the bullion.  At the end of the leasing transaction, the gold is repurchased by the 
central bank.  The central bank has earned the lease rate on the gold exchange and the bullion 
holder has earned the GOFO rate on his loaned dollars.  As we should expect, the respective 
yields from the swap are equivalent to the yields earned in the normal leasing transaction. 
  
Equation (6) can therefore be rewritten as: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )TtcTtwTtLIBORTtGOFOtIAB ,,,, −=−=  (8) 
 
where we have replaced ),( TtR  with ( )TtLIBOR , . Equations (3) and (8) lead to  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )TtwTtctIABlease ,, −=−=  (9) 
 
It can be seen from equation (9) that the lease rate may serve as a proxy for the convenience 
yield, particularly when ),( Ttw  is very small, which is the case in practice10.  
 
Given the preceding analysis and under the assumption that storage costs are equal to zero, 
the price of a gold forward contract in terms of market variables can be expressed as: 
 
 ( ) ( )TLIBORTlease eSef 00 =  (10) 
 ( )TGOFOeSf 00 =  
 
                                                 
10 The cost of storing gold in a vault is indeed close to zero; hence the cost of storage is essentially equal to the 
cost of insurance (see Geman (2005)). 
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To compare the futures price calculated using equation (10) and the observed market futures 
prices, we introduce the difference M  between the observed futures price and the theoretical 
forward price, both expressed by their logarithms 
 
 ( ) ( )forwardfuturesM loglog −=  (11) 
 
Note that we express the difference in terms of natural logarithms in order to reduce the 
heteroskedasticity in the M series. Table (III) shows summary statistics for the 1, 3, 6 and 12 
month forward/futures series. 
 
[Table III about here] 
 
The mean values of the differences increase with the maturity from a low mean value of -
0.0009 for the one month period to a high mean value of 0.19 for the 12 month one.  In 
addition, the standard deviation increases with maturity in the same manner. 
 
 
Figure 2: PLOTS OF DIFFERENCES FUTURES/ FORWARDS FOR VARIOUS YEARS AND MATURITIES 
The figure shows the spreads between gold futures and forward for maturities of 1, 3 and 12 months. As the 
contract maturity increases, the spread gets wider, particularly in recent years. This may be indicative of risk-
averse speculators demanding higher risk premiums for contracts of longer maturity. 
 
Figure (2) depicts a plot of the four time series.  We see that for the 1 month contract, the 
difference is mostly negative, indicating that calculated forward prices exceed observed 
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futures prices. However, with increasing maturities, observed futures prices exceed forward 
prices as calculated using equation (10). For the 12 month contract for instance, we see on the 
figure that the difference is mostly positive.  This is in agreement with the previous findings 
of French (1983) and Park and Chen (1985). 
 
It is known that increased speculation can affect futures prices.  We therefore expect a 
relationship between the gold market speculative pressure and the futures/ forwards 
differences. Figure (3) exhibits the percentage differences versus the level of speculative 
pressure for the entire sample period. 
 
 
Figure 3: PLOTS OF SPREADS FUTURES/ FORWARDS VS. THE LEVEL OF SPECULATIVE PRESSURE 
FOR VARIOUS MATURITIES 
The black line is a least squares regression fit to the sample data.  The slope becomes increasingly positive with 
increasing time to maturity of the contracts, indicating that speculators require higher risk- premiums to act as 
counterparties in long term Futures. 
 
In the plots, we have fitted a regression line to the data.  As the rate tenor increases, the slope 
of the fitted regression lines becomes more positive. Equivalently, this implies that futures 
prices increasingly exceed forward prices as speculative pressure increases.  If speculators 
operate in the long-term market, this suggests that there may be an increased risk premium 
attached to longer maturity futures contracts over the respective forward contract.  This may 
be indicative of a preference by speculators for a higher risk-premium when speculating on 
the long-term price of gold, reflecting an increased risk-aversion when betting on prices in 
the distant future. 
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We therefore expect to find a relationship between the lease rate and the level of inventory.  
In order for the lease rate to remain small, ),( Ttw  must be close to zero. 
A high lease rate or, equivalently, a high convenience yield under low storage costs, implies a 
high demand for physical gold and thus should have a negative coefficient in a regression of 
inventory level on the lease rate.  Additionally, we should expect that the influence of the 
lease rate on inventory levels decreases with the increasing maturity of the lease.  This is 
because short-term leasing will have a more immediate effect on inventory levels than long-
term leases.  Figure (4) shows the relationship between the lease rate and the level of 
discretionary (unallocated) inventory. 
 
 
Figure 4: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEASE RATE, INTEREST-ADJUSTED SPREAD AND 
DISCRETIONARY INVENTORY LEVEL FOR THE YEARS 1996 – 2009 
The scatter plots illustrate the relationship between the lease rate and the level of discretionary inventory.  For 
all lease durations we notice that the lease rate declines with increasing level of inventory.  This is consistent 
with the idea that the lease rate can be considered as an observable form of the convenience yield of gold.  
Furthermore, data point dispersion increases with increasing lease rate tenor, suggesting that short-term leasing 
will have a more pronounced effect on inventory levels.  The black line is a second-order polynomial fit to the 
data and is consistent with the shape of the convenience yield curve as discussed in Fama and French (1988).  
We note the similarity between the observable and inferred forms of the convenience yield as represented by the 
lease rate and interest-adjusted spread, respectively.  
 
In a similar manner to the GOFO rate, we observe an asymmetric response of the 
convenience yield to positive and negative levels of discretionary inventory, but with one 
important difference.  When the level of discretionary inventory is positive, the derived lease 
rate tends to zero as would be expected of the convenience yield.  Conversely, for the GOFO 
rate we observe a concave upwards fitted curve, suggesting that for positive inventory levels, 
the GOFO rate does not decline to zero, but rather rises with increasing levels of inventory 
after exhibiting a local minimum when the level of discretionary inventory is close to zero. 
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To examine the relationship between the lease rate and the discretionary inventory, we use 
the linear regression model specified in equation (12): 
 
 tttt InviLeaseInv εββ ++= −− 1211 )(  (12) 
 
Where 1)( −tiLease  is the prevailing 
thi  month lease rate in the previous time period, and 
1−tInv  is the level of discretionary inventory at time 1−t .  The lagged inventory term is 
present in order to capture any residual autocorrelation.  The results of the regression are 
given in table (IV). 
 
[Table IV about here] 
 
We can see that across all lease maturities, the coefficient 1β  is negative.  However, it is only 
highly significant for lease rates of one, three and six month maturities.  For the twelve month 
rate, the coefficient is only weakly significant at the 10% level and is less than half the value 
of the 6 month coefficient.  The magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficient 
diminishes with increasing maturity, being -0.11 for the 1 month rate and -0.05 for the 12 
month lease duration.  This reflects the diminishing impact of leasing activity on inventory 
levels as the lease tenor increases. The influence of discretionary inventory from the previous 
period is consistent across all maturities and the value of the coefficient remains close to 0.1, 
but is statistically insignificant. The negative lease rate coefficient and decreasing influence 
with maturity suggests that short term leasing activities act to reduce gold inventory levels.  
This occurs most likely because at time t , the bullion leased in previous time periods must be 
returned either to the central bank or the institution that leased the gold, the additional interest 
being charged in the form of bullion as opposed to dollars.  Consequently, high lease rates in 
period 1−t  lead to repayments at time t , which, in turn, lead to a reduction in market 
inventories at time t .  One plausible explanation for the declining influence with lease 
maturity is that, for the borrower, short-term lease rates tend to be lower than long-term rates, 
hence less expensive and resulting in increased short-term leasing activity.  
 
Besides bullion leasing, there is another possible factor that can affect gold inventory levels. 
An increase in the number of open futures contracts may cause exchange inventory levels to 
increase in order to meet the possible delivery of physical gold at maturity. Therefore, as a 
robustness check, we test the hypothesis that speculative pressure results in increased 
inventory levels and, to that effect, specify a linear regression of the form shown in equation 
(13): 
 
 ttttt InviLeaseInv εψβββα ++++= −−− 131211 )(  (13) 
 
Here tInv  is the inventory level in millions of troy ounces at time t , ( ) 1−tiLease  is the 
thi month tenor derived lease rate at time 1−t , and 1−tψ  is the speculative pressure at time 
1−t  which we include in order to capture any dependence of the inventory on increased long 
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trader positions. Once again, lagged inventory is included in the regression in order to capture 
the significant lag-1 component of the inventory partial autocorrelation function.  The results 
of regression (13) are shown in table (V). 
 
[Table V about here] 
 
The results in table (V) show that, by including the speculative pressure as an additional 
variable, the effect of the lease rate on discretionary inventory level decreases substantially.  
The results for the 1 month contract show that the influence of the lease rate has diminished 
in significance, the regression coefficient is now significant at the 10% level and has 
decreased in magnitude from a value of -0.11 to -0.07.  In the case of the 1 month contract, 
the relation between the lease rate and the inventory level is now considerably weaker, 
significance being just outside the 5% level of confidence.  For the 3, 6 and 12 month 
contracts, we conclude that there is no statistically significant relationship between the lease 
rate and the level of inventory. 
 
Interestingly, although the lease rate relationship has weakened, there is now a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between the lagged speculative pressure and the 
discretionary inventory level.  Furthermore, this relationship gradually increases with lease 
duration.  The speculative pressure coefficient for the 1 month contract is 0.414 while that for 
the 12 month contract is 0.449.  The lease rate and the speculative pressure appear to work in 
opposition to each other; the former acts to decrease short-term bullion inventories via lease 
repayments, while the latter result suggests speculators dominate leasing activity in the long-
term.  Finally, we note the continued presence of the carry-over effect such that the value of 
inventory at time 1−t  is positively related to inventory at time t . The results for the 
speculative pressure coefficient suggest that, due to increased speculative activity in long 
futures contracts, COMEX inventories have increased in order to cover the open contract 
positions.   
 
 
VI. Speculative Pressure: A VAR Model 
 
To examine possible links between the differences futures-forwards and speculative activity, 
we employ a vector autoregression (VAR) model11 to establish the dynamic relationship 
between the speculative pressure and the various difference series. The generalized reduced 
form specification of a VAR(p) model is given by equation (14). 
 
   rt = φ0 + Φ1rt−1 +K+ Φprt− p + εt  (14) 
 
                                                 
11 Cointegration tests were carried out between speculative pressure and the four difference series to determine if 
a VECM type model for cointegrated series was necessary.  Using the Engle and Granger test, for all series the 
hypothesis of cointegration was rejected for the 1, 3, 6 and 12 month difference series and the speculative 
pressure. The tests may be provided on demand. 
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where φ0  is a 1×k  vector, Φ is a kk ×  matrix, and εt  is a serially uncorrelated random 
process with zero mean and positive definite variance-covariance matrix Φ and 0>p . It is 
common in the literature to assume that εt  is distributed as a multivariate normal. To build 
our model, we determine the optimal lag length, p using minimization of the Bayesian 
information criteria (BIC). The model is evaluated for multiple lag lengths and the length that 
corresponds to the smallest value of the information criteria is chosen as the lag length p for 
the VAR(p) model. 
 
Using weekly data, for the 1, 3, 6 and 12 month contracts along with the speculative pressure, 
we test consecutively downwards from a maximum of 6=p  lags, calculating the associated 
information criteria, to find the optimal lag length. For comparison, and to eliminate 
dependence on a single criterion, we employ three separate measures, the Akaike (AIC), the 
Schwarz (BIC) and the Hannin-Quinn (HQ) information criteria.  If the individual criteria 
select different lag lengths, we first choose any lag length that is selected by two information 
criteria.  If all three criteria differ, we defer to the BIC selection. Using this procedure, the 
information criteria select a lag of 3 for the 1 month series, and a lag of 2 for the 3, 6 and 12 
month series. 
 
With a lag length of 2=p , the VAR(2) model can be written in a more explicit bivariate 
form of equation (14).  In terms of the speculative pressure tψ  and the difference tM , 
equation (14) can be written as  
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The OLS estimated VAR coefficients are shown in table (VI). 
 
[Table VI about here] 
 
Looking at the Φ matrices shown in the table, we see that for all maturities, the speculative 
pressure dynamics are driven by both lagged values of speculative pressure and the futures-
forwards differences. Conversely, the effect of lagged speculative pressure on the level of 
difference is statistically significant only for the 3, 6 and 12 month series, suggesting there is 
a linear dependence between the width of the spread and the speculative pressure solely for 
maturities exceeding 1 month duration.  Even though this dependence is exhibited only for 
long-term maturities, it is consistent with our finding that the relationship between futures 
contract returns and the speculative pressure is significant across all maturities: 1, 3, 6 and 12 
months.  For all maturities, both the lagged spread and lagged speculative pressure are 
significant determinants of the speculative pressure at time t . 
 
To check the models, we test the residuals for serial correlation using the multivariate Ljung-
Box statistic, ( )mQk , where k is the dimension of tr  and m is the number of lags used for the 
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test. This statistic is distributed asymptotically as 2χ  with gmk −2  degrees of freedom, g 
being the number of parameters estimated in the VAR model coefficient matrices. For the 1-
month series, the multivariate Ljung-Box statistic is 171.9 using 4 lags, with a p-value of less 
than 0.0001, suggesting that there is residual serial dependence in the bivariate return series. 
For the 3 month series, we have a value of 19.85 for the Ljung-Box test with an associated p-
value of 0.3.  Somewhat different results are obtained for the 6 month contract with a test 
statistic of 13.56 and p-value of 0.13. Finally, for the 12 month model, we note that ( ) 96.1242 =Q  with a p-value of 0.23, indicating that the model is sufficient at the 5% level. 
 
 
VII. The Effect of Lease Rates on Inventory Withdrawals 
 
It is worthwhile investigating whether changes in the lease rate, or convenience yield, 
influence the level of bullion inventory and whether or not this changes with lease duration.  
While the gold lease rate is available primarily to agents and institutions participating in the 
over-the-counter (OTC) market, it should remain a viable proxy for overall gold market 
liquidity demand.  Consequently, when the lease rate is high, it signals a period of high 
demand for bullion by the market.  Under this assumption, we might expect to see increased 
inventory withdrawals along with increases in the derived lease rate. 
 
Following Dincerler et al. (2005), we define withdrawals as the first-differenced series of 
discretionary inventory and regress inventory withdrawals on the change in the lease rate as 
specified in equation (16). 
 
 tttt InviLeaseInv εββ +Δ+Δ=Δ −121 )(  (16) 
 
Table (VII) shows that there is a weak positive influence of changes in the lease rate on 
inventory withdrawals. 
 
[Table VII about here] 
 
  Dependence on previous inventory levels is consistently negative and highly significant and 
has the rather intuitive interpretation that inventories are mean-reverting. The statistical 
significance of the results shows that there is a regular turnover of gold inventories in the 
futures market, but suggests that the quantity of leased gold remains independent of the lease 
rate level. 
 
 
VIII. The Growth Rate of Gold Forward vs. Gold Futures Prices 
 
To compare the rate of increase of the futures price of gold with the market quoted GOFO 
rate, the Kalman filter is employed to estimate a model of the joint dynamics of gold futures 
prices and their rate of increase. The Kalman filter technique is quite efficient in a setting like 
ours where the second quantity is not directly observable (see Geman and Nguyen (2005)). 
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Hence, we construct a two-state variable model involving the spot price and the rate of 
growth of the gold futures price. We denote the gold spot price and its log by tS  and tX  
respectively and specify the model below. 
 
We assume that the dynamics of the log spot price are driven under the real probability 
measure P by the following stochastic differential equation 
 
 ttt dWdtdX σσλσμ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−=
2
2
 (18) 
 
and the dynamics of the growth rate tμ  by the mean- reverting  process 
 
 ( ) tt dBdtd t ηηξμακμ ++−=  (19) 
 
where W  and B  are P -Brownian motions, the parameters λ  and ξ  respectively represent 
the market prices of log price and growth rate risk.  
 
We are working in a complete market framework12.  Consequently, this ensures the 
uniqueness of a risk-neutral measure Q , under which the dynamics of the spot price and 
growth rate have the reduced form below: 
 
 ttt WddtdX
~
2
2
σσμ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=  (20) 
 ( ) ttt Bddtd ~ημακμ +−=  (21) 
 
The correlation coefficient ρ  is given by: 
 
 tt BdWddt
~~=ρ   
 
Within this two-state variable framework, the price ( )tXF tt ,,μ , of the gold futures contract 
satisfies the following partial differential equation: 
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t
F
μημρσησμμακμ  (22) 
 
This is subject to the terminal condition that the spot price is equal to the futures price at 
maturityT : 
                                                 
12 COMEX trades at least 5 liquid gold futures contracts and our model has two sources of randomness. The 
number of traded instruments exceeds the number of sources of risk, so the market is complete. 
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                                           ( ) ( ) TXTT eTSTXF ==,,μ                                          (23)                                       
 
Following Duffie and Kan (1996) and Geman-Nguyen (2005), we know that the solution to 
equation (22) can be written as the following exponential-affine function: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) tBAtTQTt eSEF μττ +=ℑ=  (24) 
 
where 
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 ( ) κτ
κτ−−= eB 1  (26) 
 
In our model, these equations, in combination with equation (24), govern the price of a gold 
futures contract and depend upon six parameters:α ,κ , λ , σ , η  and ρ .  These parameters 
must be estimated from the observation data. One common method used for state space 
model estimation is the Kalman filter. Due to its ease of implementation and ubiquitous 
presence in the literature, it provides a convenient method by which to estimate and compare 
our model to existing models in the literature, for example that of Schwartz (1997). 
 
To perform the filtering we use weekly observations of COMEX gold futures contracts for 
the first, third, sixth and twelfth nearby gold futures contract prices over the period of 
October 1986 to October 2009 yielding a total of 712 observations. At each observation date, 
t , we possess data for four contract maturities, iτ , 4,,1 K=i .  Our time series has been 
constructed such that the contract maturities at date t  are constant and equal to 121 , 123 , 126  
and 1212 . Initialisation of the Kalman filter requires that we choose an initial parameter vector { }12631 ,,,,,,,,, hhhhρησλκαϕ = .  Furthermore, we must initialise the variance-covariance 
matrix, H  which is a diagonal matrix with elements 21h , 
2
3h , 
2
6h , 
2
12h  on the diagonal.  With 
these chosen parameters, we can estimate the parameters using maximum likelihood. 
 
 
IX. Kalman Filter and Estimation Results 
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After initialising the parameter vector and the Kalman filter matrices we ran the filter and 
obtained the optimised parameter set given in table (VIII). 
 
[Table (VIII) about here ] 
 
Table (VIII) displays the results of the log-likelihood estimation of the model parameters.  
The parametersξ , 2h and 3h  are not statistically significant.  However, all remaining 
parameters are significant at the <1% level.  We observe that the market price of risk, λ  is 
not statistically significant which is in agreement with the results of the Schwartz (1997) two-
factor model which finds a statistically insignificant market price of risk for the periods of 
1/2/85 to 6/13/95, 11/21/90 to 6/13/95 and 11/21/90 to 6/13/95.  
 
Figures (5) and (6) graphically depict the results of the Kalman filter estimation of the joint 
system dynamics.  In figure (5), we can observe a positive and consistent difference between 
the 3 month GOFO rate and the Kalman filtered asset growth rate.  The figure suggests that 
since approximately 2003 until the end of 2007, the futures contract price has been priced 
consistently higher than the forward contract price.  In terms of our model, this has the 
interpretation of an additional risk-premium in the value of the futures contract compared to 
the forward contract.  It is interesting to note that the disappearance of the risk-premium 
coincides approximately with the beginning of the recent financial crisis. 
 
This effect is depicted more clearly by the absolute difference between the filtered and quoted 
GOFO rate as illustrated by figure (6).  The figure shows the absolute difference between the 
two series and the consistent positive difference can easily be seen beginning in the early part 
of 2003 and lasting until the end of 2007.  It is this difference between the two growth rates 
that seems to be responsible for the degree of difference between the gold forward and 
futures contracts.  This positive discrepancy between the two rates will be the subject of 
future research. 
 
21 
 
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
Date
21
-M
ay
-1
99
6
03
-S
ep
-1
99
6
17
-D
ec
-1
99
6
15
-A
pr
-1
99
7
29
-J
ul
-1
99
7
11
-N
ov
-1
99
7
24
-F
eb
-1
99
8
09
-J
un
-1
99
8
13
-O
ct
-1
99
8
26
-J
an
-1
99
9
11
-M
ay
-1
99
9
24
-A
ug
-1
99
9
07
-D
ec
-1
99
9
21
-M
ar
-2
00
0
05
-J
ul
-2
00
0
17
-O
ct
-2
00
0
30
-J
an
-2
00
1
15
-M
ay
-2
00
1
18
-S
ep
-2
00
1
28
-D
ec
-2
00
1
16
-A
pr
-2
00
2
30
-J
ul
-2
00
2
12
-N
ov
-2
00
2
25
-F
eb
-2
00
3
10
-J
un
-2
00
3
23
-S
ep
-2
00
3
06
-J
an
-2
00
4
20
-A
pr
-2
00
4
03
-A
ug
-2
00
4
16
-N
ov
-2
00
4
01
-M
ar
-2
00
5
14
-J
un
-2
00
5
04
-O
ct
-2
00
5
17
-J
an
-2
00
6
02
-M
ay
-2
00
6
15
-A
ug
-2
00
6
28
-N
ov
-2
00
6
13
-M
ar
-2
00
7
26
-J
un
-2
00
7
09
-O
ct
-2
00
7
22
-J
an
-2
00
8
06
-M
ay
-2
00
8
19
-A
ug
-2
00
8
02
-D
ec
-2
00
8
17
-M
ar
-2
00
9
30
-J
un
-2
00
9
13
-O
ct
-2
00
9
μ t
Estimated and filtered μt from Kalman filter
 
 
Filtered μt
3M GOFO rate
 
Figure 5: COMPARISON BETWEEN MARKET-QUOTED 3M GOFO RATE AND KALMAN ESTIMATED   
GROWTH RATE 
The figure shows a comparison between the market quoted 3 month GOFO rate and the asset growth rate 
estimated using the Kalman filter. Starting in approximately February 2003 and ending in the latter half of 2007, 
there is an observable distinction between the GOFO rate and the filtered value suggesting a disappearance of 
the risk-premium that seems to coincide with the onset of the recent financial crisis.  
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Figure 6: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE 3 MONTH GOFO RATE AND THE KALMAN ESTIMATED ASSET 
GROWTH RATE. 
A positive difference between the two series can be observed beginning around February 2003 and persists over 
the remainder of the sample period. 
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X. Conclusion 
 
By examining the gold bullion leasing market over the period 1996-2009, we have argued 
that the derived lease rate can serve as an observable form of the convenience yield of gold. 
In such a framework, we exhibit a short-term relationship between the lease rate and the level 
of discretionary market inventory.  In particular, we have shown that bullion leases of 1-
month duration have a strong impact on inventory levels.  Due to the nature of the gold 
leasing transactions, whereby interest on a bullion lease is repaid in the form of bullion, our 
results suggest that the 1-month lease rate has a negative effect on inventories such that lease 
repayments cause inventory levels to fall.  However, this effect seems to be mitigated by the 
actions of speculators whose demand for long futures contracts results in increased inventory 
levels.  Additionally, this speculative effect is seen to be consistently independent of the lease 
rate duration.  Despite this, the lease rate does not appear to influence the size of inventory 
withdrawals. This could explain the mild influence of inventories on the price of gold (in 
contrast to most other storable commodities). 
 
 We have also shown that speculative pressure is positively and significantly related to 
futures returns.  Controlling for price pressure, we find that while the price pressure 
hypothesis dominates speculative effects for futures returns calculated from short-term 
contracts, we cannot reject the hypothesis that long-term speculation has a positive effect on 
gold futures returns.  That is, increased speculative activity in gold futures contracts is 
associated with higher futures returns.   
 
Finally, our model has revealed an interesting decoupling of the GOFO rate and the growth 
rate of gold futures contract prices. In the period beginning late 2003 until the approximate 
onset of the recent crisis, there is evidence of a distinct and positive difference between the 
market quoted GOFO rate and the estimated growth rate, probably because of the arrival of 
new investors in the gold market. Historically, monetary authorities and hedging activities of 
gold producers used to dominate the gold market. The decreases in producer hedging activity 
and increased demand for gold as a financial asset have led to increased speculative activity 
in the bullion market. The subsequent recent participation and activities of gold ETFs may 
lead to an even more fundamental change in the gold futures market. 
 
 
 
23 
 
References 
 
Abken, P. A., 1980, The economics of gold price movements, Economic Review, 66, 3–13. 
 
Casassus, J., and P. Collin-Dufresne, 2005, Stochastic convenience yield implied from 
commodity futures and interest rates, Journal of Finance, 60, 2283–2331. 
 
Cox, J. C., J. E. Ingersoll, and S. A. Ross, 1981, The Relation between forward prices and 
future prices, Journal of Financial Economics, 9, 321- 346. 
 
De Roon, F. A., T. E. Nijman, and C. Veld, 2000, Hedging pressure effects in futures 
markets, Journal of Finance, 55(3), 1437–1456. 
 
Duffie, D., and R. Kan, 1996, A yield-factor model of interest rates, Mathematical Finance, 
6(4), 379–406. 
 
Engle, R. F., and K.F. Kroner, 1995, Multivariate simultaneous generalized ARCH, 
Econometric Theory, 11, 122–150. 
 
Fama, E. F., and K. R. French, 1987, Commodity futures prices: some evidence on forecast 
power, premiums and the theory of storage, Journal of Business, 60, 55–73. 
 
Fama, E. F., and K. R. French, 1988, Business cycles and the behavior of metals prices, 
Journal of Finance, 43, 1075–1093. 
 
French, K. R., 1983, A comparison of futures and forward prices, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 12, 311–342. 
 
Gehr, A. K., and T. F. Martell, 1994, Derivative usage in the gold market and its impact on 
spot gold, Journal of Derivatives, 1(4), 68–79. 
 
Hirshleifer, D., 1990, Hedging pressure and futures price movements in a general equilibrium 
model, Econometrica, 58(2), 411–428, March. 
 
Hotelling, H., 1931, The economics of exhaustible resources, Journal of Political Economy, 
39, 137–175. 
 
Houthakker, H. S., 1957, Can speculators forecast prices?, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 39(2), 143–151, May. 
 
Kaldor, N., 1939, Speculation and economic stability, Review of Economic Studies, 7(1), 1–
27, October. 
 
Keynes, J. M., 1930.  The Applied Theory of Money (Macmillan & Co., London). 
 
24 
 
Kocagil, A. E., 1997, Does futures speculation stabilize spot prices? Evidence from metals 
markets, Applied Financial Economics, 7(1), 115–125. 
 
Lesmond, D. A., J. P. Ogden, and C. A. Trzcinka, 1999, A new estimate of transaction costs, 
Review of Financial Studies, 12(5), 1113–1141. 
 
Lewis, N., 2007. Gold: The Once and Future Money (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken). 
 
Lucey, B. M., and E. Tully, 2006, Seasonality, risk and return in daily COMEX gold and 
silver data 1982-2002, Applied Financial Economics, 16(4), 319–333, February. 
 
Machlup, F., 1969, Speculations on gold speculation, American Economic Review, 59(2), 
332–343, May. 
 
Park, H. Y., and A. H. Chen, 1985, Differences between futures and forward prices: A further 
investigation of marking to market effects, Journal of Futures Markets, 5, 77–88. 
 
Routledge, B. R., D. J. Seppi, and C. S. Spatt, 2000, Equilibrium forward curves for 
commodities, Journal of Finance, 55(3), 1297–1338. 
 
Salant, S. W., and D. W. Henderson, 1978, Market anticipations of government policies and 
the price of gold, Journal of Political Economy, 86, 627–648. 
 
Sanders, D. R., S. H. Irwin, and R. M. Leuthold, 1998, Noise traders, market sentiment, and 
futures price behaviour, Working Paper. 
 
Schwartz, E. S., 1997, The stochastic behavior of commodity prices: implications for 
valuation and hedging, Journal of Finance, 52(3), 923–973. 
 
Solt, M. E. and P. J. Swanson, 1981, On the efficiency of the markets for gold and silver, 
Journal of Business, 54(3), 453–478, July. 
 
Tobin, J., 1958, Estimation of relationships for limited dependent variables, Econometrica, 
26, 24–36. 
 
Working, H., 1953, Futures trading and hedging, The American Economic Review, 43(3), 
314–343, June. 
 
25 
 
 
Coefficient Estimate Std. Err. t-ratio p-value 
1M Returns 
α  0.0004 0.0008 0.51 0.61 
1β  0.0041 0.0502 0.08 0.93 
2β  0.0328 0.0381 0.86 0.39 
3β  0.0084 0.0021 3.90 <0.0001*** 
3M Returns 
α  0.0004 0.0008 0.49 0.62 
1β  0.0108 0.0494 0.22 0.83 
2β  0.0366 0.0377 0.97 0.33 
3β  0.0084 0.0021 3.93 <0.0001*** 
6M Returns 
α  0.0004 0.0008 0.48 0.63 
1β  0.0106 0.0498 0.21 0.83 
2β  0.0387 0.0376 1.03 0.30 
3β  0.0085 0.0021 3.94 <0.0001*** 
12M Returns 
α  0.0004 0.0008 0.45 0.65 
1β  0.0083 0.0504 0.16 0.87 
2β  0.0459 0.0375 1.22 0.22 
3β  0.0086 0.0021 4.01 <0.0001*** 
 
Table I:  REGRESSION OF RETURNS ON SPECULATIVE PRESSURE FOR THE YEARS 1996 – 2009 
The table contains the estimation statistics of the regression model: 
tt
PS
ttiti rrr εψβββα ++++= − 3500&21,1, .  The results demonstrate that current returns are not related to 
past returns.  Additionally, we note that gold futures returns are positively, but insignificantly related to returns 
on the S&P 500 index. Additionally, we note that the level of speculative pressure is positively and significantly 
related to futures returns, suggesting that increased speculation leads to slightly higher returns, although the 
coefficient, 3β  is rather small in magnitude, being on the order of 0.008 
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 
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Coefficient Estimate Std. Err. t-ratio p-value 
1M Returns 
α  0.0008 0.0008 1.00 0.32 
1β  -0.0483 0.0518 -0.93 0.35 
2β  0.0323 0.0338 0.95 0.35 
3β  0.0022 0.0008 2.76 0.006** 
4β  0.0097 0.0009 11.17 <0.0001*** 
3M Returns 
α  0.0008 0.0008 0.97 0.33 
1β  -0.0434 0.0511 -0.85 0.40 
2β  0.0360 0.0338 1.07 0.29 
3β  0.0022 0.0008 2.78 0.006** 
4β  0.0098 0.0009 11.16 <0.0001*** 
6M Returns 
α  0.0007 0.0008 0.95 0.34 
1β  -0.0436 0.0516 -0.84 0.40 
2β  0.0381 0.0336 1.13 0.26 
3β  0.0023 0.0008 2.81 0.005** 
4β  0.0097 0.0009 11.17 <0.0001*** 
12M Returns 
α  0.0007 0.0008 0.92 0.36 
1β  -0.0451 0.0521 -0.86 0.39 
2β  0.0453 0.0333 1.36 0.18 
3β  0.0023 0.0008 2.89 0.004** 
4β  0.0096 0.0009 11.15 <0.0001*** 
 
Table II: ROBUSTNESS CHECK FOR THE REGRESSION OF RETURNS ON SPECULATIVE PRESSURE 
AND PRICE PRESSURE FOR THE YEARS 1996 – 2009 
The table shows the results of a robust specification of the returns regression model given by equation (2) In this 
regression, we include both a speculative pressure term and a price pressure term, specified as the change in 
speculative pressure from time 1−t  to time t .  We divide both series by their respective standard deviation in 
order to compare them effectively.  Results show that, after controlling for price pressure, the effect of 
speculative pressure on returns is mitigated.  While still significant at the 1% level, the value of the speculative 
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pressure coefficient, 3β , is considerably reduced.  However, we note that the speculative pressure effect does 
remain statistically significant at the <5% level across all returns series and increases with the maturity horizon.  
This is consistent with our previous findings that speculators may be induced to speculate long term as their 
increased risk-aversion for long-term bets resulting in higher futures contract risk-premiums. 
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Variable Statistic 
1 Month Tenor 
Mean  -0.0009 
Std. Dev. 0.0012 
Min -0.0087 
Median -0.0007 
Max 0.0028 
3 Month Tenor 
Mean  0.0941 
Std. Dev. 0.2129 
Min -0.7248 
Median 0.0819 
Max 0.7614 
6 Month Tenor 
Mean  0.1294 
Std. Dev. 0.2148 
Min -0.6706 
Median 0.1228 
Max 0.8221 
12 Month Tenor 
Mean  0.1932 
Std. Dev. 0.2268 
Min -0.5912 
Median 0.1917 
Max 1.1103 
 
Table III: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE 1, 3, 6 AND 12-MONTH  SPREAD FOR THE YEARS 1996 - 
2009 
The table shows summary statistics for the series of the log-differences of observed futures prices and 
theoretical forward contract prices.  Separate statistics are given for 1, 3, 6 and 12 month contract maturities.  
Although the 1 month contract exhibits a small degree of under-pricing of futures relative to forwards, we 
observe and increasingly positive mean in the 3, 6 and 12 month series, suggesting that, for these contracts, 
futures are over-priced, on average, relative to forwards. 
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Coefficient Estimate Std. Err. t-ratio p-value 
1M Lease Rate 
1β  -0.1068 0.0379 -2.82 0.005** 
2β  0.0916 0.0736 1.24 0.214 
3M Lease Rate 
1β  -0.0887 0.0353 -2.51 0.012* 
2β  0.0942 0.0745 1.26 0.207 
6M Lease Rate 
1β  -0.0682 0.0322 -2.12 0.034** 
2β  0.0977 0.0750 1.30 0.193 
12M Lease Rate 
1β  -0.0511 0.0284 -1.80 0.072. 
2β  0.1001 0.0747 1.34 0.181 
 
Table IV REGRESSION OF INVENTORY LEVEL ON LAGGED LEASE RATE AND INVENTORY OVER THE 
PERIOD 1996-2009 
Shown are the results of the regression tttt InvLeaseInv εββ ++= −− 1211 .  The lag-1 level of inventory 
was included to capture a possible autocorrelation.  Across all maturities, the coefficient of lagged inventory 
remains positive, but statistically insignificant suggesting there is no carry-over inventory effect.  Notably, the 
effect of the lagged lease rate diminishes with increasing lease rate duration.  This suggests that short-term 
leasing has a more pronounced effect on current inventory levels.  The negative coefficient implies that short-
term lease repayments, in the form of physical bullion, act to reduce the current inventory level. 
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 
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Coefficient Estimate Std. Err. t-ratio p-value 
1M Lease Rate 
1β  -0.0650 0.0379 -1.71 0.08. 
2β  0.0680 0.0742 0.92 0.36 
3β  0.4139 0.1088 3.81 <0.001*** 
3M Lease Rate 
1β  -0.0559 0.0354 -1.58 0.11 
2β  0.0683 0.0748 0.91 0.36 
3β  0.4283 0.1095 3.91 <0.0001*** 
6M Lease Rate 
1β  -0.0426 0.0326 -1.58 0.19 
2β  0.0696 0.0750 0.93 0.35 
3β  0.4416 0.1089 4.05 <0.0001*** 
12M Lease Rate 
1β  -0.0316 0.0285 -1.11 0.27 
2β  0.0705 0.0746 0.95 0.34 
3β  0.4498 0.1071 4.20 <0.0001*** 
 
Table V: REGRESSION OF INVENTORY AGAINST LEASE RATE AND SPECULATIVE PRESSURE OVER 
THE PERIOD 1996-2009 
The table shows the coefficient estimates and associated regression statistics for the regression model: 
ttttt InviLeaseInv εψβββα ++++= −−− 131211 )( .  By controlling for speculative pressure, we note that 
the effect of the lease rate on discretionary inventory level is now very weak and significant at just under the 
10% level of significance for the 1 month rate tenor.  This suggests that speculative pressure increases inventory 
levels counteracting the negative effect of lease repayments. 
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 
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Panel A: VAR Model Estimation 
Tenor Parameter 
0φ  1Φ  2Φ  
1 Month 
Coefficient 0.0056 1.1557 6.4058 -0.1896 -4.3062 -0.0008 0.0005 0.2930 -0.0002 -0.0737 
      
Std. Err. 0.0047 0.0364 2.6700 0.0364 2.6784 0.0001 0.0005 0.0376 0.0005 0.0377 
3 Month 
Coefficient 0.0050 1.1552 0.0298 -0.1868 -0.0474 0.0556 0.1829 0.5022 -0.1355 -0.1474 
      
Std. Err. 0.0037 0.0363 0.0169 0.0363 0.0169 0.0081 0.0799 0.0372 0.0800 0.0372 
6 Month 
Coefficient 0.0051 1.1559 0.0348 -0.1875 -0.0488 0.0711 0.1982 0.5149 -0.1331 -0.1181 
      
Std. Err. 0.0039 0.0362 0.0171 0.0363 0.0171 0.0085 0.0792 0.0373 0.0793 0.0373 
12 Month 
Coefficient 0.0043 1.1584 0.0369 -0.1909 -0.0411 0.1028 0.2404 0.5008 -0.1489 -0.0840 
      
Std. Err. 0.0045 0.0363 0.0165 0.0364 0.0164 0.0102 0.0825 0.0375 0.0828 0.0373 
Table VI: VAR(2) MODEL ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The table shows the OLS estimated coefficients along with their standard errors for the VAR(2) model defined 
in the equation: 
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Coefficient Estimate Std. Err. t-ratio p-value 
1M Lease Rate 
1β  0.1068 0.1063 1.00 0.32 
2β  -0.4988 0.0504 -9.90 <0.0001*** 
3M Lease Rate 
1β  0.1198 0.1424 0.84 0.40 
2β  -0.4982 0.0506 -9.85 <0.0001*** 
6M Lease Rate 
1β  0.2265 0.1914 1.18 0.24 
2β  -0.4978 0.0507 -9.82 <0.0001*** 
12M Lease Rate 
1β  0.1901 0.2421 0.79 0.43 
2β  -0.4977 0.0509 -9.79 <0.0001*** 
 
Table VII: REGRESSION OF WITHDRAWALS ON CHANGES IN THE LEASE RATE OVER THE PERIOD 
1996-2009 
The table shows the regression output for the model: tttt InviLeaseInv εββ +Δ+Δ=Δ −121 )( .  This 
examines the effect of the lease rate on inventory withdrawals, while controlling for past inventory withdrawals. 
The coefficient 2β  remains nearly constant in value, negative and statistically significant across all lease rates.   
Signifigance codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 
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Parameter Estimation Std. Err. t-value p-value σ  1.3618 0.0313 43.5138 0.0000 κ  0.2396 0.0245 9.7779 0.0000 α  0.0248 0.0167 1.4805 0.1392 
λ  0.0000 0.2853 0.0000 1.0000 η  0.0163 0.0006 25.3381 0.0000 ρ  0.4255 0.0324 13.1239 0.0000 
1h  -0.0024 0.0001 36.1522 0.0000 
3h  0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 0.9999 
6h  -0.0005 0.0000 -32.3597 0.0000 
12h  0.0003 0.0001 3.9473 0.0001 
Log-Likelihood  -117788.7   
 
Table VIII: KALMAN FILTER ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Parameter vector optimization results from the log-likelihood maximization.  
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